Description
Layer two, cybersecurity appliance for
Multi branches companies
SCADA systems
Industrial BitNetSentry (iBNS), Remote Station.
Basic configuration includes:
Layer two, cybersecurity appliance for
Multi branches companies
SCADA systems
Weight | 1100 g |
---|---|
Dimensions | 160 × 160 × 25 mm |
Model Name 1 | iBNS Base Station (BSE) |
Part Number 1 | ES3000-iBNS-BSE-01P-SNBDX-WX |
Description 1 | iBNS, Base Station for remote management |
Model Name 2 | iBNS Remote (MBC) |
Part Number 2 | ES3000-iBNS-MBC-01P-SNBDX-WX |
Description 2 | iBNS, Remote Station for companies with muli sites |
Model Name 3 | iBNS Remote (SCD) |
Part Number 3 | ES3000-iBNS-SCD-01P-SNBDX-WX |
Description 3 | iBNS, Remote Station for SCADA systems |
SW version | ES00X.2.1.2x |
PP (Pairs of Lan Ports) | BSE: 1 / 2 |
Ethernet Ports | BSE: 2 / 4 x 1GbE RJ45 (Total 2 or 4 ports) |
Max number of EP (End Points), e.g. PC, laptop, server, IoT device, supported by the BNS | unlimited |
Max number of VC (Virtual Channels) | BSE:80 in + 80 out (Total 160) |
Encryption | Encryption data traffic per selected channel/s according to AES 256 bit standard (optional) |
Input Voltage | Unregulated 10 – 15VDC input, external AC/DC adopter |
Power Consumption | 5W – 15W |
Operating Temperature | -40°C to 70°C |
Relative Humidity | 10% to 90% (operation), 5% to 95% (storage) |
Reliability | MTBF: > 100,000 hours |
Material | Die Cast Aluminum |
Cooling | Passive Cooling Fanless Design |
Certifications (EMC) | RoHS compliant |
ISO/IEC 15408 | Common Criteria (CC) for Information Technology Security Evaluation – ISO/IEC 15408, EALs 1-7 compliance |
Warranty | 3 years (optional 10 years in total) |
Lead Time (Max) | 7 weeks |
Status | Available |
Secure communication between organization’s branches and data center, even if VPN’s password became available to the hacker.
Migration of the “weakest” link in security chain which is the Human Element. Current practice is to use VPN which is insufficient because these tools become useless once the hacker gains access to the password or encryption keys. In addition, firewalls and data-leakage prevention tools, which are visible to the hacker in the network, can be bypassed.
SCADA systems face the challenge of been infiltrated by an external hacker or having faulty (and dangerous) commands sent due to human error.
Current practice is to use galvanic separation (e.g., physical demarcation) to prevent attacks or transmission of incorrect commands. However, galvanic separation is both expensive to deploy and maintain, and prevents useful communication from human-machine interface to critical infrastructure.